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Abstract 
In  a  duopoly    where  each  firm  produces  substitute  goods,  we  show  that  under  process 
innovation,  specialization  is  the  equilibrium  attained  with  cross-licensing.  Each  firm 
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Introduction 
Antitrust law historically has viewed cross-licensing or pooling agreements with suspicion 
because these mechanisms are potentially capable of promoting collusion in the product 
market.  
The literature on cross-licensing has in fact stressed that it facilitates collusion. C.Shapiro 
(1985 p.26) states that: ”two rivals (with or without innovations) alternately could design a 
cross-licensing agreement whereby each would pay the other a royalty per unit of output, 
ostensibly for the right to use the other’s technology. By imposing a “tax” on each other 
….., the firms could again achieve the fully collusive outcome. A cross-licensing contract 
may  be  required  to  achieve  the  fully  collusive  outcome  if  the  firms  produce  different 
products or are otherwise heterogeneous”.  
M.Eswaran (1993) assumes that the firms license their technologies to each other but tacitly 
agree not to produce from the acquired technology as long as the contracting firm does not 
defect. In an infinitely repeated game it is shown that collusion can be sustained from tacitly 
restricted level of production by credibly introducing the threat of increased rivalry in the 
market for each firm’s product .   
P.Ling (1996) is close to M.Eswaran’s contribution as fixed fee licensing makes firms’ 
costs symmetric and increases the licensee’s scope for retaliation. 
C.Fershtman  and  M.Kamien  (1992)  deals  with  cross  licensing  of  complementary 
technologies, that may be independently  developed by different firms. Relevant to this note 
is the problem the firms face about how to design a cross licensing agreement such that the 
resultant  non-cooperative  game,  yields  equilibrium  profits  identical  to  the  cooperative 
outcome.  
 
This Note studies product specialization in a duopoly  where each firm produces two imperfect- substitute 
goods. We show that under process innovation, specialization is the equilibrium attained under optimal cross-
licensing arrangements. The optimum licensing contracts are royalty-contracts. Royalties are set so as to 
implement the joint-profit maximization (monopoly) outcome as the unique Nash equilibrium of the 
competition game. The monopoly-First-Best optimum is attained: i) each firm produces solely the good for 
which it has a technological advantage; ii) the quantities of goods which are produced are the monopoly levels;  
iii) firms' joint profits attain the First Best optimum, but social  welfare do not improve with respect to no 
licensing.  We show that the same results are attained with patent pool. 
 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 1 describes the basic framework where the two 
firms diversify their production and considers the introduction of the process innovation 
that may lead to  product specialization. Section 2 discusses the cross licensing and the 
product  specialization  which  results  from  that.  Section  3  analyzes  the  welfare  effects. 
Section 4 extends the analysis to patent pool.  
 
 
1. Two firms diversifying their production 
Let’s consider a model of an industry composed by two symmetric firms, and two imperfect 
substitute goods, good 1, good 2.  Each firm can produce both goods. We assume linear 
demand functions: 
 
                                                                 p1 =  a  -  θ (q21 + q22) –  (q11 + q12)    
[1]             
                           p2 =  a  -  θ (q11 + q12) –  (q21 + q22) , 
 
where pi is the price of good i, i =1,2, qij the quantity of good i produced by firm j, and  θ ∈ 
(0, 1]  represents the degree of product differentiation. 
Firm cost functions are linear and symmetric: each firm produces good i, i =1,2, at the 
constant  marginal cost, c. We assume c < a  in order to avoid a corner solution. 
Firm profit functions are: 
 
Π1 = p1q11 + p2q21 – cq11 – cq21 
Π2 = p1q12 + p2q22 – cq12 – cq22. 
 
Let’s assume Cournot competition. Firm 1 chooses its outputs: 
    Max { q11(p1- c) + q21(p2- c)  }  
   q11, q21 
s.t. [1]             
q11≥ 0, q21≥ 0,                [2] 
and Firm 2 chooses its outputs : 
    Max { q12 (p1- c) + q22(p2- c)  } 
    q12, q22 
s.t. [1]             
q12 ≥ 0, q22 ≥ 0,  
                        
Equilibrium outputs,  prices and profits  of   system [2] are given by: 
q11  = q12  =  q21   =  q22  =  (a - c ) / [3(1+θ)] 
 p1    =  p2    = (a + 2c)/3. 
Π1 =  Π2 =  2 (a - c )
2 / [9(1+θ)]. 
We then have: 
Proposition  1  In  a  duopoly  composed  by  two  symmetric  firms  that  both  produce  two 
imperfect  substitute  goods  and  linear  demand  functions  [1],  there  exists  a  unique  Nash 
equilibrium where both firms produce positive quantities, for c < a  . 
Both firms are active in both markets and there exists limited specialization. 
 
 
1.1  A process innovation 
Let’s now suppose that Firm 1 discovers and patents a cost reducing technology for good 1 
such that c = 0,  and  Firm 2 for good 2 such that  c = 0.  
The  profits functions are (the subscript P denotes process innovation) : 
 
 Π1P = p1q11 + p2q21  – cq21               
Π2P = p1q12 + p2q22 – cq12. 
 
In  Cournot competition,  Firms 1 and 2 again choose their (individual) profit-maximizing 
outputs:  
Max { q11 p1 + q21(p2- c) } 
q11, q21 
s.t. [1] , q11≥ 0, q21≥ 0 
                        [3] 
Max { q12 (p1- c) + q22 p2 } 
q12, q22 
s.t. [1] , q12 ≥ 0, q22 ≥ 0 
 
Solving system [3] leads to:  
1)  if  
c < [a(1-θ)/(2+θ)]   ,          [4] 
then there is limited  specialization (differentiation):  
Equilibrium outputs are strictly positive, and are given by: 
                                      q11  = q22  =  [a + c - aθ + 2θc] / [3(1-θ
2)],                            [4.a] 
 
                                    q12  = q21 =  [a - 2c - aθ - θc] / [3(1-θ
2)] .                                  [4.b] 
 
Prices and profits (the subscript LC denotes limited specialization and Cournot prices) are: 
 p1    = p2    =  (a + c)/3 , 
  
Π1LC  =  Π2LC = [(a + c )
2 + (a - 2c )
2 - 2θ (a + c )(a - 2c )] / [9(1-θ
2)].          [4.c] 
 
2)  if  
c > [a(1-θ)/(2+θ)]     ,         [5] 
then there is full specialization:  
Equilibrium outputs, prices and profits (the subscript FM  denotes full specialization and 
monopoly pricing) are: 
q12*  = q21*  =  0  ,     
  [5.a]  
q11*   = q22*   = a / (2 +θ)       
[5.b] 
p1*    = p2*       =   a / (2 +θ)       
Π1FM  =  Π2FM  = [a / (2+θ)]
2 .      
[5.c] 
 
Case 2 is the case of drastic innovation 
2. That is, there is specialization if and only if 
inequality [5] holds.  
Clearly, if the innovation is drastic (inequality [5] holds), then firms earn monopoly profits: 
i) each firm produces solely the good for which it has a technological advantage; ii) the 
quantities of good 1 and 2 which are produced are the monopoly levels as given by [5.b]. 
When the innovation is non-drastic, i.e. inequality [4] holds, then both firms produce both 
goods, and firms' profits fall below monopoly levels (by [4.c], [5.c].
3 
Proposition 2: I.) If the innovation is drastic, if condition [5] holds, then the Nash-Cournot equilibrium entails 
full specialization:  i) each firm produces solely the good for which it has a technological advantage; ii) the 
quantities of goods 1 and 2 which are produced are the monopoly levels as given by [5.b]; iii) firms' joint profits 
attain the First Best optimum. 
                                                 
2 It is an adaptation of  the drastic and non drastic innovation differences discussed by 
Arrow (1962). A drastic innovation arises in case  the monopoly price by means of the new 
technology does not exceed the competitive price under the old technology  (Kamien and 
Tauman, 1986  p.472). 
 
3 It suffices to note that both equilibria are symmetric, so that in both cases each firm gains 
half of the industry profit. The result then follows from the fact that industry profit must be 
higher when each segment of the market is monopolised by the firm who is more efficient 
in producing the corresponding good. 
In a formal way, for all feasible c and all θ,  ΠiFM >  ΠiLC,  i = 1,2. This follows because: a) 
ΠiLC  is decreasing in  c,  for  c < [a(1-θ)/(5+4θ)]. It is increasing in c for [a(1-θ)/(5+4θ)] < 
c < [a(1-θ)/(2+θ)]; b) ΠiLC < ΠiFM,  for  c ∈ [0, a(1-θ)/(5+4θ)).  Whence,  ΠiFM   > ΠiLC  for 
all   θ;  and ΠiFM  = ΠiLC , iff  c = [a(1-θ)/(2+θ)].    ■ 
  
II) If  the innovation is non-drastic, if condition [4] holds, then the Nash-Cournot equilibrium entails limited 
specialization: each firm produces both goods, output levels are given by [4.a]-[4.b], firms' joint profits fall 
below the First Best optimum.  
 
Clearly, in the case of non-drastic innovation, firms  would be better off if they could commit to joint profit 
maximization. 
 
Corollary 1. Let the innovation be non-drastic. Suppose firms can commit to joint profit 
maximization. Then:  i) each firm produces solely the good for which it has a technological 
advantage; ii) the quantities of goods 1 and 2 which are produced are the monopoly levels 
as given by [5.b]; iii) firms' joint profits attain the First Best optimum. 
 
This immediately follows from Proposition 2. 
 
However, the only credible commitments  are those that are incentive compatible, and  q12 *    
= q21*  = 0, are not. Indeed, the unique Nash-Cournot equilibrium has 
                                    q11  = q12  =  q21   = q22  > 0   (by II. of Proposition 2). 
We show below that  there  exists a cross - licensing scheme that implements the collusive 
outcome: the unique Nash-Cournot equilibrium entails full specialization, and firm profits 
attain the First Best optimum level.  
 
 
2. Cross-Licensing  
We now consider the possibility of a technology transfer from firm 1 to firm 2 for good 1 
and vice versa for firm 2 under licensing by means of a two part tariff (fixed fee, Fi  and 
royalty, ri ) . 
We assume that the innovation is observable and verifiable, and similarly for output. Contracts of 
technology transfer from firm 1 to firm 2 (and vice versa) are then enforceable and the payments by 
the recipient can be conditioned on recipient’s output. We shall refer to technology transfer 
contracts as to licensing contracts, and name the party that makes the technology transfer the 
licensor and the recipient the licensee.  More specifically, a licensing contract states parties’ 
obligations as follows: the licensor discloses the new technology to the licensee. The licensee pays 
the licensor a fixed fee and/or a royalty per unit of its output. Contract offers are made by one 
firm, the other either rejects the offer or accepts it. If the latter rejects it then it will necessarily use  
the old technology, if it accepts it then royalty-payment obligations are due independently of the 
technology used and therefore its profit-maximizing choice is necessarily to adopt the new (cost-
reducing) technology.   
The game played by the two firms is a non-cooperative two-stage game. In the first stage 
each firm simultaneously offers a licensing contract to its rival who then chooses whether to 
accept it or reject it. We shall make the conventional assumption that when each firm is 
indifferent between accepting the rival’s licensing offer and rejecting it, it chooses to accept 
the offer. In the second stage firms engage in quantity Cournot competition as described in 
Section 1.  
The profits functions are (the subscript Lic denotes licensing):  
Π1Lic = p1q11 + p2q21 + r1q12 – r2q21 + F1- F2     
Π2Lic = p1q12 + p2q22 – r1q12 + r2q21  + F2 - F1. 
where outputs, q11 , q21, q12 , q22, are the outcome of the Cournot competition second stage 
game, given the royalty rates set at the first stage. Specifically, for any given royalty rates, 
equilibrium outputs, prices and profits are: 
 
q11  = [a + r1 - aθ + 2θr2] / [3(1-θ
2)] 
 q12  =  [a – 2r1 - aθ - θr2] / [3(1-θ
2)]                              
q21   = [a – 2r2 - aθ  - θr1] / [3(1-θ
2)] 
                                                                                              [6] 
q22  =  [a  + r2 - aθ + 2θr1] / [3(1-θ
2)] 
p1    =  (a + r1)/3 
p2    = (a + r2)/3 
 
At the first stage, each firm i chooses (ri, Fi) in order to maximize its profits subject to 
rival’s participation constraint, and output non-negativity constraints. That is: 
firm 1 
                                                Max  Π1Lic (r1, r2,..) 
                                                 r1, F1 
                                                  
                                        s.t.   Π2Lic  (r1, r2,..)   ≥  Π2LC ,  q11≥ 0, q21≥ 0, q12 ≥ 0, q22 ≥ 0, and r1, 




                                                Max  Π1Lic (r1, r2,..) 
                                                 r2, F2 
                                                   
                                        s.t.   Π1Lic (r1, r2,..) ≥  Π1LC ,  q11≥ 0, q21≥ 0, q12 ≥ 0, q22 ≥ 0,  and r2, 
F2 ≥ 0 , 
where: 
 
Π1Lic  = 1/3 {(a + r1) [a + r1 - aθ + 2θr2] / [3(1-θ
2)]   + (a + r2) [a – 2r2 - aθ  - θr1] / [3(1-θ
2)]} 
+  r1  [a – 2r1 - aθ - θr2] / [3(1-θ
2)]   -  r2 [a – 2r2 - aθ  - θr1] / [3(1-θ
2)] +  F1- F2 ; 
 
Π2Lic  = 1/3 {(a + r1)[a – 2r1 - aθ - θr2] / [3(1-θ
2)]  +  (a + r2)[a  + r2 - aθ + 2θr1] / [3(1-θ
2)]}+   
r2  [a – 2r2 - aθ  - θr1] / [3(1-θ
2)]  -  r1[a – 2r1 - aθ - θr2] / [3(1-θ
2)] + F2 -F1. 
 
In the unique Nash equilibrium, licensing contracts are: 
r1= r2 =  a(1-θ)/(2+θ),  F1 = F2 >0 , 
these are payoff equivalent to pure royalty contracts:  
r1= r2 =  a(1-θ)/(2+θ),  F1= F2 = 0 .                               [7] 
 
For any given c that satisfies inequality [4], i.e. for non-drastic innovation, the royalty rate  
exceeds the cost reduction (by [7]).  Using [7], and solving for outputs, prices and profits, 
leads to: 
q11*  = q22*  =  a /(2+θ)   
q12*  =  q21*   =  0    
p1*  = p2*    =   a /(2+θ)   
Π1Lic  =  Π2Lic  = a
2 /(2+θ)
2  
This leads to: 
Proposition 3 
The optimum licensing contracts are the royalty- contracts defined by [7]. These implement the monopoly-
First-Best optimum:  i) each firm produces solely the good for which it has a technological advantage (full 
specialization); ii) the quantities of goods 1 and 2 which are produced are the monopoly levels, identical to 
[5.b]; iii) firms' joint profits attain the First Best optimum. 
 
Royalty-licensing contracts act as an incentive-compatible commitment device for attaining joint-profit 
maximization. The firm that has a technological (cost) advantage in the production of good j, let say firm j, 
licenses its technology to its rival, i.e. firm i, by means of a royalty contract: a) the royalty is set to a level such 
that the licensee (rival firm i) finds it optimal to abstain from producing good j (in equilibrium, royalties are not 
paid); b) royalty-licensing contracts are designed so as to act  as off-equilibrium threats to implement the joint-
profit maximization (monopoly) outcome as the unique Nash equilibrium of the Cournot-competition game. 
 
 
3. Welfare effects 
We now compare social welfare between cross-licensing and the process innovation status quo. 
We have: 
Proposition 4 
Social  welfare  in  the  cross-licensing  case,  WiLic=  3a
2/(2+θ)
2,  is  lower  than  with  no–
licensing, WiLC = [(2a-c)/3(1+θ)]
2 + 2[(a + c )
2 + (a-2c)
2 - 2θ (a + c )(a - 2c )] / [9(1-θ
2)], for 
all feasible c and all θ.      
    
Proof  
Notice that the maximum value attainable by is cmax= [a(1-θ)/(2+θ)]  and that WiLic  =  WiLC 
(cmax). 
Notice that  WiLic <  WiLC (c = 0). 
The result then follows from observing that WiLC (c) decreases in c, it attains a minimum at 
c= c1,                       
c1 =  8a(1-θ)/(5θ+13), 
which is greater than  [a(1-θ)/(2+θ)] . ■ 
  
 
4. Patent pools 
The patent pool game differs from the cross-licensing game above in that at the first stage 
(i.e. the licensing stage), firms act cooperatively: firms 1 and 2 choose (ri, Fi) that maximize 
joints profits. In the second stage, firms again engage in quantity Cournot competition.  The 
solution is again: 
ri = a(1-θ)/(2+θ),                 Fi = 0 , 
 
That is the royalty rate is identical to that derived  for the cross licensing case. The same 
holds for outputs, prices and profits: each firm produces solely the good for which it has a 
technological advantage (full specialization), and the quantities of goods 1 and 2 which are 




We have studied product specialization in a duopoly where each firm produces two imperfect-substitute 
goods. We have shown that under process innovation, specialization is the equilibrium attained under optimal 
cross-licensing arrangements, as well as under patent pool. The optimum licensing contracts are royalty 
contracts. These are designed so as to implement the joint-profit maximization (monopoly) outcome as the 
unique Nash equilibrium of the competition game. The monopoly-First-Best optimum is attained:  Each firm 
produces solely the good for which it has a technological advantage, firms' joint profits attain the First Best 
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